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n Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (2001), the protagonist comments 
that “we look at an animal and see a mirror” (39). His point is 
that people consistently attribute human qualities to nonhuman 
animals, anthropomorphizing — and distorting — animals through 
an anthropocentric gaze that brushes everything it touches with a ven-
eer of humanity. A mirror ref lects back that which faces it, and if a 
nonhuman animal is a mirror, then it either lacks self and subjectivity 
entirely, or the human gaze has no access to that subjectivity. Animals 
are not “pure” objects in Martel’s work: they function independently 
of human directives, and human characters frequently interpret and 
respond to the actions of nonhuman characters, as Pi does with the tiger 
Richard Parker throughout much of Life of Pi. The issue is not that the 
animals are pure objects, but that their subjectivity is inaccessible, after 
the fashion of Jacques Derrida’s absolute Other,1 in which the “being-
there-before-[Derrida]” is a subject who can look at him, but whose sub-
jectivity is at once completely present and completely unreachable (11). 
Beatrice and Virgil (2010) contains several categories of animals, 
including (1) live animal characters, (2) taxidermied mounts and animal 
skins, and (3) allegorical animals nested in a play within the framing 
text. Thus, there is a minimum of three layers of animal representation, 
comprised of (1) living animals, (2) disarticulated and rearticulated 
mounts made from the skins and bones of animals, and (3) animals 
that are purely fictitious even within the text itself. The interplay among 
these layers, as mediated by the narrator, mitigates not only the subjec-
tivity of the animals as the narrator perceives it, but also the presence 
of the animal Other at all. The narrator’s gaze strikes the surface of the 
animal and is returned, but the same act performed upon the shell of an 
animal that is no longer living, with the same result, casts doubt upon 
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the fact of the agency of the Other within the novel altogether. This 
speaks to one of the fundamental questions facing postmodern animal 
literature: is it possible to represent something as subject whose subjec-
tivity cannot be known? The three-fold animal-as-Other in Beatrice and 
Virgil addresses this doubt in the context of layered articulation, with (1) 
the animal represented in narrative and (2) the self-conscious construc-
tion and problematization of animality through the taxidermied mounts 
and the metafictional animal characters that are based on these mounts.
Beatrice and Virgil presents its three categories of animals as subjects 
at various points in the novel, despite Western culture’s stigmatization 
of the subjectification of nonhuman animals. Typically, an animal is 
considered anthropomorphic in any narrative in which it exhibits men-
tation or more than the simplest of sensations (e.g., pain), and Martel 
pushes beyond this low threshold with speaking, reading animals in the 
embedded play and with the meaningful gaze of the animal in the novel 
as a whole. Streamlining matters somewhat, Luc Ferry comments that 
“We are, at least since Descartes, authorized to treat animals as simple 
things devoid of the slightest ethical significance” (148). The Cartesian 
philosophy that animals do not reason and do not have souls has filtered 
into most, if not all, branches of science (Fudge 99), and it reached 
its most extreme form in the rise of behaviourism and operationalism, 
which marginally softened Descartes’s conceptualization of animals as 
beings without minds or souls to the idea that people “do not and can-
not know that animals think or feel, so to be parsimonious we should 
just assume that they do not” (Luke 180). This sort of disavowal of non-
human animal affectivity and mentation creates a culture of objectifica-
tion in which anything with regard to nonhuman animals that cannot 
be scientifically proven is, in the name of objectivity, assumed not to 
exist. Bluntly put, objectification of animals is a more socially sophis-
ticated and socially acceptable behaviour than the subjectification of 
animals. Nevertheless, Martel has crafted a novel in which nonhuman 
animals frequently transgress their allotted place as object. However, 
although these transgressions initially appear to validate nonhuman 
animal subjectivity, the human protagonist whose narrative gaze filters 
these subjectifying animals, Henry L’Hôte, subjectifies carcasses and 
taxidermied mounts in addition to living animals, thus marking the 
animal subject in the novel as originating from the narrator’s imagina-
tion rather than the animals’ inherent subjectivity.
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Representations of nonhuman animal subjectivity are closely tied to 
anthropomorphism, and partake of the contentious nature of anthropo-
morphism.2 To anthropomorphize an animal is, literally, to give it a 
human shape. This shape need not be physical, although it can take 
physical form, as it does in Beatrice and Virgil, for example, when a 
howler monkey reads the newspaper. Anthropomorphism attributes 
human characteristics — such as speech, thoughts, and morals — to 
nonhumans. The trouble with this is twofold. First, human represen-
tations of animals must always be couched in the anthropomorphic 
because humans cannot escape their essential humanness to present 
anything outside of a human frame of reference. Second, which charac-
teristics are human alone, or to what degree nonhumans possess them, 
is a matter of ongoing debate. The strictest followers of behaviourism 
would deny consciousness, for example, to any nonhuman, and argue 
that the representation of consciousness or mind in any nonhuman 
is patently anthropomorphic. Such representations of animals do not 
represent their animalness, say the behaviourists. On the other side of 
the argument, but troubled by the same question, those who believe 
in nonhuman animal subjectivity wonder about appropriation of ani-
mals into an anthropocentric, anthropomorphic frame. Contemplating 
the ethics of representation, Don McKay writes that although it is not 
possible to avoid anthropocentrism, people “can perform artistic acts 
in such a way that, in ‘giving things a face’ [sic] the emphasis falls 
on” the acknowledged Other rather than the human frame that shapes 
human understandings of the nonhuman (99). Rather than using the 
nonhuman to express humanity, language can use humanity to express 
the nonhuman (McKay 99). Perhaps this blend is an essential element 
for creating relationships with the Other. In J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives 
of Animals, Elizabeth Costello suggests that empathy is an essential 
element of morality, saying that “[t]he particular horror of the [Nazi 
death] camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on there was 
a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared with 
their victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. 
The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place 
of their victims” (34). They refused to relate, to imagine what it would 
be like if their situations were reversed, or what it would be like to be 
“this being-there-before-me” (Derrida 117). Such logic suggests that 
some degree of anthropomorphism is an essential component for ethical 
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relationships with nonhumans, at least if it could conform to McKay’s 
vision of invoking the animal in honour of the animal rather than as a 
tool with which to discuss the human.
This ethical dilemma is the primary concern of this article. To what 
degree does Beatrice and Virgil use animals as animals? The work is, 
of course, filtered through the lens of human perspective and human 
language, but it is rife with animal imagery and much that might be 
considered anthropomorphism. For the most part, however, potentially 
anthropomorphic attributes or descriptions can be credited to the nar-
rator’s imagination, or to the use of animals for purposes other than 
the representation of animals. Henry’s pets Erasmus and Mendelssohn, 
for example, possess the ability to experience boredom and the char-
acteristic of a retiring nature, respectively, but these descriptions are 
attributable to Henry’s imagination, as he is both the narrator of the 
story and the ostensible author of Beatrice and Virgil. Thus, their pot-
entially anthropomorphic descriptors become symptomatic of human 
fallibility, not a challenge to conceptions of what qualities are inherent 
to the animals themselves. Descriptions that suggest subjectivity in the 
novel’s nonhuman animals are laid at Henry’s feet, the anthropomorph-
ic product of his imagination as the novel’s narrator and author rather 
than a valid quality inherent to the animal characters. The animals are 
represented through so many layers of human interpretation that there 
is little left to represent them as animals; instead, Henry’s understanding 
of them as animals becomes the focus.
Likewise, donkey and monkey Beatrice and Virgil do not perform as 
animals within the novel. As taxidermied mounts in Okapi Taxidermy, 
even their physicality has been carefully sculpted by the taxidermist, 
whose name is also Henry. The taxidermist further takes and moulds 
their physicality and their characters in his play A 20th-Century Shirt, 
which the narrator removes still further from the once-animals of the 
living creatures in his re-creation of the lost manuscript. The play itself 
is allegorical, and Beatrice and Virgil function allegorically within it. 
Allegorical anthropomorphization includes “descriptions of animal 
behavior that are not intended to be interpreted as biological fact,” and 
these descriptions use animals “to make an argument more appealing 
or to conceal true identities” (Lockwood 45). The set of similarities 
required in order to forge the connection between the levels of significa-
tion make Beatrice and Virgil too human. They are manifestly not the 
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monkey and the donkey they are representing, except insofar as they 
are creations forged from the taxidermied mounts of what were once 
animals, using the superficial structure of animals to create things that 
look like but are not animals. Beatrice’s tale of torture, Virgil’s discovery 
that he has been made a non-citizen, and the murders of both charac-
ters serve to humanize the monkey and the donkey, so that the nods 
to their animal skins and the gestures to animal characteristics, such 
as Virgil’s fondness for bananas, seem to be more dark humour than 
active attempts to retain “the animal” for the purposes of the allegory. 
The Beatrice and Virgil in the taxidermist’s play are subjects despite 
their objectification by governmental edict and persecution by humans. 
They speak, philosophize, and read. Beyond the physical characteristics 
of the animals whose skins they wear, however, they are not animals. 
The anthropomorphism that facilitates the allegory shapes them into 
what John Burroughs calls “human beings disguised as animals” (131). 
What subjectivity they have comes from their ability to speak their own 
names and to represent themselves linguistically as Henry does to assert 
his own subjectivity, and even then, the play’s embedded metafictional-
ity marks the animal characters as not merely humans in the shape of 
animals but as fundamentally human constructs.
A construct is an object, by virtue of its status as a created thing, but 
Henry begins the novel by troubling this easy distinction in his critique 
of his own objectification by others, an act that blurs the edges of the 
standard human-subject/animal-object binary. Contemplating his own 
renown as an author, he notes that fame is “entirely external, coming 
from the minds of others. It exist[s] in the way people [look] at him or 
[behave] towards him. In that, being famous [is] no different from being 
gay, or Jewish, or from a visible minority: you are who you are, and then 
people project onto you some notion they have” (5). Here Henry identi-
fies the core difference between being seen as a subject or an object: he 
recognizes himself as the mirror, reflecting back what people expect to 
see. A critical part of objectifying someone is to make that someone a 
something. That is to say that objectification begins with the denial of 
the “I” in another, with the idea that the being that one is looking at 
cannot apprehend that look, cannot look back. It is a simple thing to see 
a being as an object: one must merely fail to recognize that being as one 
with consciousness, intent, voluntary actions, or a point of view distinct 
from one’s own (see Derrida 6-11). Henry, like most humans, has the 
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ability to represent himself linguistically, to say “I” and speak his own 
subjectivity and believe himself to be heard and seen as a subject on the 
basis of his ability to refer to himself as a self, self-aware and responsive. 
Even so, he experiences the gaze of others who see him first as a body 
carrying his career and success before they see him as person and subject 
(see Martel 167).
Nonhumans have no ability to represent themselves linguistically to 
humans, unless a given narrative anthropomorphizes them to the extent 
that they acquire human language and thus lose any hold they might 
have on representing the “purely” animal, but Henry is keenly aware of 
animal subjectivity. When Henry introduces his dog and cat, Erasmus 
and Mendelssohn, he emphasizes their subjectivity at the expense of 
their physical appearance. Neither is purebred, and the only physical 
description he provides is that Mendelssohn is black. Unlike donkey and 
monkey Beatrice and Virgil, the shape of these animals is apparently 
unimportant. They might be long- or short-haired, fat or slender, gold- 
or copper-eyed. The descriptions of them that Henry finds important 
pertain to their personality characteristics and behaviours: the animals 
are “bright-eyed and vigorous,” Erasmus “rambunctious, but easy to 
train” and Mendelssohn “retiring” and with a propensity for avoiding 
strangers (26). They are companion animals in the truest sense of the 
word. They companion Henry. Mendelssohn does this in an introspec-
tive, meditative fashion, Erasmus in an extroverted, interactive way. 
Henry’s neglect of the animals’ appearance in favour of their behaviour-
al attributes is an indicator that he considers Erasmus and Mendelssohn 
subjects, but the same perceptual difficulties adhere to seeing the Other 
as to seeing an object. Henry’s gaze is untrustworthy. He creates the 
animals’ subjectivity as much as authors construct the subjectivity of 
their characters, and this construction of subjectivity is made doubly 
clear by Henry’s ostensible authorship of Beatrice and Virgil.
One indicator of the unreliability of Henry’s ascription of subjectiv-
ity comes from the time that Henry spends with Mendelssohn. Henry 
equates Mendelssohn’s attention to him while he plays the clarinet with 
that of the howler monkey skull he has purchased from the taxidermist, 
whose name is also Henry: he has, he believes, “two faithful spectators” 
in “Mendelssohn, who was patiently fascinated in the way only cats 
can be, and the monkey skull. . . . Their round eyes, the cat’s and the 
skull’s, were always on him when he played” (119). The skull is more 
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spectre than spectator, but Henry invests its eye sockets with the same 
attention as Mendelssohn’s living gaze, a comparison between an empty 
skull and a living animal that marks their attention as Henry’s creation 
and, consequently, constitutes a denial of the cat’s subjectivity.
Erasmus is a surer barometer of subjectivity, both of his own being 
and that of others. Henry not only enjoys spending time with the dog 
but also talks to Erasmus, and fancies that he reads comprehension in 
Erasmus’s facial expressions (53). He describes the dog as “responsive” 
(53), a word that recalls the widespread contention among philosophers 
that “the animal” cannot respond to the human in a way that can be 
properly distinguished from a reaction (Calarco 125), and this denial 
of the possibility of response makes the animal an object. Henry, how-
ever, believes that Erasmus is capable of response, and only a subject 
may respond to another; all else is reaction. It is evident, however, that 
at least some of what Henry believes is fanciful: as a dog, Erasmus 
may recognize some words in addition to recognizing tone and behav-
iour that reveal emotional states (see Wang and Tedford 167), but he 
would not be able to follow a running monologue, as Henry suggests 
he can. Ironically, the degree of response-ability that Henry has granted 
to Erasmus jeopardizes Henry’s narrative reliability. Henry’s subjective 
gaze endangers the legitimacy of the dog’s subjectivity. By amplifying 
the dog’s ability to respond beyond the credible, and by equating the 
cat’s subjective gaze with that of a skull, Henry has undermined the 
subjectivity of the novel’s two real, living nonhuman animals.
Erasmus’s behaviour is also a better indicator of subjectivity in others 
than Henry’s observations. Henry has a tendency to bestow mindful-
ness upon the dead, as with the howler monkey skull, and create nar-
ratives for — and emotions in — that which is wholly object, without 
mind or self. When he enters Okapi Taxidermy for the first time, for 
instance, he is struck by the lifelike nature of the stuffed animals, and is 
particularly interested in a set of tigers, manufacturing a narrative that 
includes a fantastical pair-bonded tiger couple (60-61). Like Richard 
Parker in Life of Pi, these tigers are “an anthropomorphic trope writ 
large,” whose “consistent humanization” is the basis for their charac-
ters (Cole 28, 30). Erasmus, however, rejects Henry’s anthropomorphic 
narrative; he is “the only living animal in the room, [and is] as bored 
as a child in an art museum” (60-61). He does not confuse the appear-
ance of life with the fact of life, but reacts to the animal mounts the 
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same way he would react to a coffee table, which is not at all. He reacts 
only to other living beings, such as the taxidermist, and to the sound 
of a howler monkey as recorded on a cassette player. When Erasmus 
hears the howler’s cry, he stiffens and pricks up his ears and appears 
to tremble, and then begins to bark, a reaction that Henry suggests is 
a sympathetic emotional response to the emotion in the howler’s cry 
(74). The power of Erasmus’s reaction to the sound of a living animal 
contrasts with his indifference toward the animal mounts. Henry sees 
subjectivity in objects, whereas he records no such tendency in Erasmus. 
In this case, Henry’s descriptions of Erasmus’s behaviour show the fal-
lacy of Henry’s subjective gaze and also suggest that Erasmus is, in fact, 
a subject, capable of differentiating between objects and other subjects 
and, potentially, of responding to his perception of those subjects.
Erasmus is also the animal gone mad in Beatrice and Virgil. In 
a pathos-saturated scene, Henry discovers Mendelssohn savaged by 
Erasmus, and a veterinarian must euthanize both of his pets on the 
same day. Mendelssohn dies quietly, “trusting” Henry all the way to 
death, but Erasmus is killed in a gas chamber, dying “mouth froth-
ing, eyes rolling and legs trembling” (161). Rabies’s zoonotic proper-
ties highlight an essential similarity between humans and nonhuman 
animals: the bite of a mad animal will make a mad animal, and that 
madness does not differentiate between the human and the nonhuman 
(Wasik and Murphy 3). Erasmus’s deterioration to this “bestial” state 
suggests a prior higher level of functioning, from which he devolves 
into something not “himself,” a state Henry had noticed at several 
earlier points (e.g., 119). In their description of a rabid dog, Wasik and 
Murphy explain that “[o]ne could hardly grieve for the dog, because the 
dog was already gone. To euthanize it . . . was merely to acknowledge 
its departure” (223). That is to say that the thing that makes the dog an 
individual was gone and only a shell remained; that shell is the object, 
as much as the skin of an animal without the animal in it is an object. 
In his madness, Erasmus has lost that which makes him “himself,” a 
nod to a subjectivity noticed through its absence. Although this depic-
tion acknowledges animal subjectivity, subjectivity that requires the 
death of the animal validates an animal being that is no longer present. 
Beatrice and Virgil offers an animal subject that appears genuine rather 
than constructed ex post facto, because Erasmus’s hinted-at subjectivity 
can only be validated by the death of that subjectivity. Like Derrida’s 
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conceptualization of the animal as an absolute Other, the once-subject 
is completely inaccessible, because acknowledgment of that subjectivity 
is predicated upon its present absence. If that is indeed the case, there 
is no way to approach that subjectivity, and it cannot be recognized 
while the animal is still a subject.
Henry’s narrative construction of the subjectivity of the novel’s living 
animals and its dead ones mirrors what the taxidermist accomplishes 
with his more literal animal representations. A taxidermist takes the skin 
and sometimes bones of an animal and creates a human vision of what 
that animal is, working with physical aspects of an animal to accom-
plish the same sort of (re-)articulation that writers use words to achieve. 
A taxidermist’s work is one of extreme objectification. He takes a thing, 
a corpse, and, choosing what to keep and what to discard, uses parts of 
it to make a whole new thing. “The taxidermied mount,” Garry Marvin 
explains, “is only a superficial animal; it is, literally, only skin deep, but 
that surface must be crafted to convey a sense of the whole. In this sense 
a mount is a simulacrum [that] attempts to convey those proper qual-
ities of the living and original animal, but it can never be more than an 
appearance” (114). That is, the taxidermied mount is just that: a mount, 
not an animal. It is the taxidermist who gives the mount shape, who 
determines its pose and expression. The taxidermist takes an animal 
out of its skin and fixes the skin onto a frame, adding, removing, and 
positioning in order to enhance this superficial understanding of what 
the animal is. Henry L’Hôte wonders how “someone so involved with 
animals should react so little — in fact, not at all — to a live one right 
in front of him. The taxidermist [does not] even [glance] at Erasmus” 
(86), but the taxidermist is not involved with animals. “Involvement” 
implies some sort of relationship. The taxidermist’s work is with the 
dead, with disarticulation and reconfiguration of bodies that have no 
life left in them, that are pure objects (see Sands 46). The dead have no 
mind left with which even to attempt to assert subjectivity. Henry the 
taxidermist mirrors the processes of Henry the writer, whose articula-
tions of animals are narrative-based. Henry the writer imposes his own 
mental vision of the animal subject upon the animal’s physical being, 
and the novel’s concern with the process of that creation emphasizes 
the roles of both Henrys in the construction of the animal characters. 
This is true of the taxidermist’s creations, of Henry L’Hôte’s narration 
of Erasmus and Mendelssohn — and Henry, as the purported author 
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of Beatrice and Virgil as well as its protagonist, has absolute authority 
over their representation — and of Henry’s narration of the novel’s pure 
animal objects, the taxidermied mounts and animal corpses.
Because Henry’s point of view is unreliable, any subjectivity that he 
sees in any nonhuman animal is suspect, and his persistent perception 
of the presence of a subject in the remnants of what were once animals 
undermines the subjectivity that he sees in living animals. Staring at 
the skinned body of a fox, Henry sees a mouth “open, as if in a scream,” 
a soul, and then “a being caught in its moment of greatest agony, shud-
dering uncontrollably, beyond reason and beyond help” (156). He sees 
in the skin and the skinless corpse a being that was once “sentient,” 
that had “soul,” projects its death throes upon it, and is aghast (156). 
Some of this is the empathetic imagining of the fox’s death, but its 
projection into the present moment, not imagining the fox prior to its 
death but its agony now, post-mortem, blurs that line between seeing 
the animal as a subject and creating the animal subject. Impositions of 
subjectivity upon what are clearly objects, such as the fox skin, the tiger 
mounts, and the howler monkey skull, indicate that Henry does not see 
Erasmus and Mendelssohn as subjects, but as objects reflecting back his 
imposed narrative of subjectivity. The subjectivity that Henry grants to 
the inanimate casts doubt upon his ability to truly see any subject, and 
suggests that what he sees is his own projection of idea, narrative, and 
being reflected back at him.
Mirroring Henry’s constructed animal subjectivity, the taxidermist’s 
play, A 20th-Century Shirt, also contains constructed animals, although 
these are fictional even within the fiction of Beatrice and Virgil. In the 
play, the taxidermist has created articulate animal characters — Beatrice 
and Virgil — who have been extracted in their turn from the taxider-
mied mounts that the taxidermist has himself constructed. This makes 
Beatrice and Virgil doubled and doubly constructed, both as taxiderm-
ied characters within the novel and as living characters within the play. 
The taxidermist’s impetus for seeking out Henry is, in fact, his desire for 
assistance in character construction, in describing the physical aspects of 
Beatrice and Virgil. It is, in Henry’s words, “a conventional descriptive 
job, matching a concrete reality with its most obvious verbal counter-
parts” (83). With this sort of description, this articulation of minute 
physical details such as the “loops and whorls” on Virgil’s palms “that 
look like the finest silverwork” (82), the taxidermist usurps the typical 
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visual medium of a play in favour of the linguistic. “ATTENTION!” 
one of the posters projected onto the back wall will read; “Large monkey 
with black face and bearded chin. Body thick and heavy. Tail long and 
naked at tip” (77). This obsessive attention to detail, although surely 
correlated with and necessary to the taxidermist’s job, functions as an 
added measure of control: with Henry’s help, the taxidermist is fixing 
the animals’ characteristics in his own words. The taxidermist’s drive 
to map every inch of Beatrice’s and Virgil’s bodies shows an obsessive 
need for control, both in terms of the play and the corpses that inspired 
the protagonists. At the same time as he is recording what Beatrice and 
Virgil are, as bodies, he is also determining how their physicality is 
expressed, and in large part also describing his own creations, as Victor 
Frankenstein might describe his Creature. Taxidermists “make models 
of animals”; they “fix,” “sew back,” and “repaint and shellac” (Martel 
68-69). In short, the taxidermist has physically created Beatrice and 
Virgil, from their life-like appearance to the shine on Virgil’s nails, as 
much as he has returned them to a representation of what they were 
when the animals were alive.
This is textbook objectification. The taxidermist’s store contains the 
shells of animals, sculpted and positioned just so, “fixed and immobile” 
(Martel 147) and completely under the taxidermist’s control. Animals 
are typically “denied the power to refer to themselves through deixis, 
the power to point to the world and to themselves in the same thrust in 
order to ‘say’: Here I am” (Berger and Segarra 8), and the taxidermied 
mount can only reaffirm the self and subjectivity of the one describing 
it while marking the thingness of the object referent. The speaker is in 
control of the representation of the thing and, in the taxidermist’s case, 
even in the actual physical appearance of the thing being represented. 
Beatrice and Virgil are objects that the taxidermist has imbued with 
life and a story, both in his positioning of the physical animals and 
in his creation of their characters in the play. Beatrice and Virgil not 
only positions Henry as a human author telling the story of nonhuman 
characters, but it also has a human character within it creating a story 
for nonhuman characters to tell. This sort of metanarrative empha-
sizes the artifice behind the storytelling, coating even the taxidermist’s 
play, in which a monkey and a donkey form the speaking protagon-
ists, with a layer of objectivity. The characters are talking, but they are 
not real. They are the product of a human imagination. The animals 
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that inspired them are dead and their skins mounted. They are utterly 
dominated by their human re-creator. Even Henry sees the text of the 
play as “fixed and immobile, like one of [the taxidermist’s] mounted 
animals,” with the one controlling the dissemination of the text as the 
one in control of the text itself (147). This in turn ref lects Henry’s 
position as the narrator and author of Beatrice and Virgil, with absolute 
authority over the articulation of his representations of Erasmus and 
Mendelssohn. The emphasis on this process of creation, Henry’s, the 
taxidermist’s, and the novel’s, foregrounds the human engineering that 
creates the text’s (suspect) animal subjects and in so doing relegates the 
animals themselves to a place of secondary importance. This is neither 
an address to nor a translation of the other, as McKay describes the 
process of representing animals (99, 28), but an inscription of human 
acts upon animal constructs.
Because of the amount of control the two Henrys have over the ani-
mals in the novel, who are narrated and in many ways created by them, 
any anthropomorphization originates from a human source within the 
text itself, a position that reaffirms human subjectivity without chal-
lenging the Western standard of nonhuman objectification. Henry’s 
subjective gaze empathetically reanimates the fox’s corpse and gives 
emotion to the taxidermied tigers, and that same gaze renders thoughts 
and emotions in living nonhuman animals without demanding that 
others acknowledge those thoughts and emotions as real, as originating 
from the animal characters rather than Henry’s imagination. Similarly, 
it is Henry’s subjective gaze that describes Mendelssohn as “retiring” 
and Erasmus as “bored as a child in an art museum” (26, 61). These are 
empathetic acts, inferring qualities and characteristics from behaviours, 
and are often considered anthropomorphic, but the descriptions them-
selves may be laid at Henry’s doorstep; he has observed the animals’ 
actions and labelled them as symbolizing a retiring nature or a state of 
boredom. The Beatrice and Virgil in A 20th-Century Shirt are clearly 
anthropomorphic, but the characters originate from the taxidermist, 
filtered through the cheesecloth of Henry’s memory in his reconstruc-
tion of the play. The play is an allegory, where symbols convey a hid-
den moral message, and both animal characters function on a largely 
symbolic level in the play. When Henry presses for specifics about why 
the taxidermist used Beatrice and Virgil for the play, the taxidermist 
claims that it is “[b]ecause monkeys are thought to be clever and nimble, 
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and donkeys are thought to be stubborn and hardworking. Those are 
the characteristics that animals need to survive. It makes them flexible 
and resourceful, able to adapt to changing conditions” (101). This is 
what Confederation poet Charles G.D. Roberts refers to as the “salient 
characteristics” by which animals are known (141). Because it is “simple 
to remember that the tiger [is] cruel, the fox cunning,” animals come 
to be seen, “for the purposes of literature, as types or symbols merely” 
(Roberts 141). Beatrice and Virgil do not represent themselves as ani-
mals, but rather serve symbolic functions, representing certain charac-
teristics, nonhuman animals as a group, and those groups of people who 
were victimized in Nazi Germany. In this sort of anthropomorphization, 
it is evident that the animals are really people wearing the skins of ani-
mals. Their constructed subjectivity drives the play, but the allegorical 
nature of the play undermines their status as animals.
A curious inversion occurs with these characters. Because there is no 
early indication that Beatrice and Virgil are animals, Henry, like any 
reader coming to the novel without prior knowledge of it, initially reads 
Beatrice and Virgil as human. Thus, any symbolic referents brought 
to bear on Beatrice and Virgil early in the novel will be purely human 
symbols to Henry and the naïve reader, flipping the standard symbolic 
order as the symbolic qualities of human characters inform an initial 
reading of animal characters.3 In concert, Beatrice and Virgil strongly 
recall The Divine Comedy and these characters’ roles as docents; the 
symbolic function of the names is difficult to escape and pre-empts the 
symbolic functions that the embodied characters have as donkey and 
monkey. The symbolic functions of the animals in language are the 
primary means through which most humans reference most nonhumans 
(Huggan and Tiffin 139), but the play initially reverses this to layer 
historical and literary symbolism upon animals. The animals are func-
tioning symbolically within an allegory, but additional literary symbol-
ism layers their representation, merging historical, literary, and animal 
symbolism within individual characters. They function within the play 
itself, then, as multi-layered symbols, signifying something other than 
themselves, which shifts the focus from the animal self, or subject.
The objectification of the novel’s taxidermied animals parallels the 
symbolism in A 20th-Century Shirt, not only in the animal characters 
but also in the setting of the country of Shirt itself. A shirt is a covering, 
meant to — at least nominally — conceal and protect, and may contain 
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symbolic meaning on its own; the Shirt, for example, is striped like a 
concentration camp inmate’s. The Shirt is arbitrary and artificial, and 
can function as a placeholder for the body it covers, in the same way 
that the skins of animals represent the animals themselves. In addi-
tion, just as the Shirt is both a shirt and symbolic of the parcelled-out 
world, so taxidermied mounts represent both “real” animals and the 
purchasers’ and taxidermists’ visions of what those animals represent 
(see Luke 94). People make meaning of them. They are pure objects, 
without the ability to contradict or to make meaning of their own. 
This link between the shirt and the mounted animal skins also links 
the setting to Beatrice and Virgil, who are characters created out of 
mounted animal skins. They are fictional constructs made from the 
shells of animals, functioning within a fictional work inside a fictional 
work, and they are functioning as symbolically within that work as is 
the shirt. In Paul Shepard’s words, “The allegorical animal is bent on 
giving us a lesson. It may be based on real or imagined behavior, but 
always has a second meaning, a traditional, instructive purpose, usu-
ally well known and needing no interpretation” (220). In a location 
provided in the play (see 148-49), Henry finds “irrefutable proof that 
[the taxidermist is] using the Holocaust to speak of the extermination 
of animal life. Doomed creatures that could not speak for themselves 
were being given the voice of a most articulate people who had been 
similarly doomed. He was seeing the tragic fate of animals through the 
tragic fate of Jews. The Holocaust as allegory” (173). The play links 
Beatrice and Virgil to the victims of Nazi Germany, and the slaughter 
of animals to the Holocaust.
Of course, as much as the Holocaust is being used to speak of the 
fate of animals, so is the fate of animals being used to speak of the 
Holocaust.4 Much of the extant criticism of Beatrice and Virgil focuses 
on its treatment of the Holocaust and, specifically, the allegory that 
pairs animals and Jews. “[I]s the novel,” Danielle Sands asks, “a text 
that approaches and interprets animal suffering and extermination 
through the Holocaust, or is it the opposite, ‘a kind of philosoph-
ical meditation on the Holocaust’ in which animals are employed as a 
defamiliarizing tool?” (42). Reviewers such as Missy Schwartz believe 
the latter. Some, however, believe that the Holocaust is being used to 
think about animals (Lasdun). This reversal “has the effect of trivial-
izing the Holocaust” (Kakutani), in that such critics believe that the 
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novel uses the Final Solution as the vehicle that conveys the tenor, or 
subject, of the allegory. The issue, to these reviewers, is not that Jews 
are being compared to animals. As J.M. Coetzee asserts, slaughterhouse 
and stockyard comparisons abound in descriptions of the Holocaust, 
the “crime of the Third Reich” being that it “treat[ed] people like ani-
mals” (20). The issue lies in the inversion of the metaphor, as it were, 
as exemplified by the rebuke that “[if ] Jews were treated like cattle, it 
does not follow that cattle are treated like Jews. The inversion insults 
the memory of the dead” (Coetzee 50). Sands, however, argues that 
allegory and representation are ambiguous in this novel, and that such 
ambiguity “enables the reader to consider both the ethics of storytelling 
and the relationship between human and nonhuman animals” (42). 
The objectification of the animals mirrors the objectification of victim-
ized people in Nazi Germany, and, equally, the objectification of vic-
timized people in Nazi Germany mirrors the objectification of animals. 
Both Beatrice and Virgil and the play within it pair and compare these 
two objectified collective nouns — “animals” and Nazi Germany’s 
“undesirables” — and problematize the ways in which they interact.
As much as the play uses animal genocide to frame the Holocaust, 
so it also uses the Holocaust to frame the “irreparable abomination” of 
animal genocide (Martel 134-35), and the objectification of the victim-
ized is at the heart of both. Virgil is astonished to read a government 
edict that announces “a new category of non-citizens” and that “he — 
he himself personally” is the “target” of this announcement (128). In 
being so classified, he has become one whose voice does not count. He 
is not a citizen of the country; he has been made less than others, worth 
less than others through governmental edict. As with the “undesirables” 
in Nazi Germany, Virgil has been reduced from a state of some sig-
nificance, from a being with acknowledged rights if not parity in his 
society, to that of a subhuman (“Victims”). Western cultural hierarch-
ies of worth would position Virgil just so, as not only nonhuman but 
subhuman; but this is news to Virgil, who lives in the country of Shirt, 
where this new law has only recently come into effect. The atrocities 
done to Virgil and Beatrice and the other victims in the play, who 
have also presumably become non-citizens, can be countenanced only 
because the victims are subhuman. Those designated as non-citizen 
(or subhuman or Untermensch) are defined by their lack of something 
essential to the standard that the designators have set. Virgil is not a 
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citizen, and therefore he is not accorded the rights of a citizen. He is less 
than a citizen, less than a human, and therefore conventions surround-
ing the ethical treatment of citizens (or humans) do not apply to him. 
The power is in those who possess the ability to give names. People do 
not designate themselves Untermensch; others apply that designation to 
them. People also name, designate, and categorize animals, and even 
the naming of “the animal” itself is one of distancing. “The animal is 
a word,” according to Derrida, “that men have instituted, a name they 
have given themselves the right and the authority to give to the living 
other,” and into this “catch-all concept [go] all the living things that man 
does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbours, or his brothers” (23, 
34). That is to say that the concept of the animal contains all those liv-
ing beings that humans recognize as living but that are not human, not 
the same, and so are therefore either Other or object. Neither the Other 
nor an object designates itself as such. The taxidermist’s allegory uses 
acts of designating, of marginalizing a set group through designation, 
to link the Holocaust with the fates of nonhuman animals.
This linking problematizes the objectification of both groups: if ani-
mals are not simply other than but less than human, to translate this into 
the taxidermist’s stated position of human treatment of animals, then 
wrongs done to them are less wrong, or perhaps not even wrong at all 
(see Luke 164-65). Similarly, if groups of humans can be re-categorized 
as animals in a human-subject/animal-object binary, they will share the 
same considerations of what constitutes moral or ethical treatment of 
that group. This idea of who — or what — can be treated in a moral or 
immoral manner is something with which Henry L’Hôte struggles as 
he considers the text that the taxidermist has sent him as their initial 
point of contact. This text is Gustave Flaubert’s “The Legend of Saint 
Julian Hospitator,”5 and it is referenced later in the play in the form of 
the human body that Beatrice and Virgil discover and name Gustav. 
In the story, Julian grows up to be an indiscriminate slaughterer of 
animals, killing joyfully and in great excess, but Henry believes that it 
is “for killing his parents that [Julian] wanders the earth forlornly and 
it is for opening his heart to a divine leper that he is saved. His stu-
pendous hunting carnage only provides the great stag that curses him. 
Otherwise, the slaughter, a wished-for extinction of animals, is a sense-
less orgy about which Julian’s saviour has not a single word to say” (42-
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43). According to Henry, then, the animal genocide in which Julian was 
involved in his youth is immaterial to his initial damnation and to his 
eventual salvation. In this story, acting upon animals is amoral behav-
iour, and amoral behaviour pertains primarily to objects. Throwing 
a stone into a lake is not immoral per se, but tossing a baby in after it 
is. Again mediating the layers of metanarrative in the novel, Henry is 
able to problematize animal objectification through his thinking about 
Flaubert’s story, but he is unable to recognize the self-reflective nature 
of the subjectivity that he sees in the animals he encounters.
Beatrice and Virgil are subjects in the taxidermist’s play, although 
the novel problematizes that subjectivity by emphasizing the layers of 
construction that have created their fictionalized subjects. Their objecti-
fication by other characters in the play, reminiscent of Henry’s assess-
ment of his own objectification early in the novel, highlights both the 
mental processes by which one group of humans can justify victimizing 
another group and how those same processes work in human inter-
actions with nonhuman animals. The animality inherent to Beatrice 
and Virgil, however, is only skin deep. The allegorical anthropomorph-
ism that allows them to become so enmeshed in the Holocaust narrative 
effectively turns them into humans in fur coats, animal-skinned people 
who speak and read and assert their subjectivity in the same way that 
Henry is able to assert his own subjectivity: linguistically.
The real, living animals in Beatrice and Virgil have no such recourse. 
If an animal cannot assert its own subjectivity, it must depend upon 
humans to recognize it as a subject, and here the problem of the mir-
roring gaze reasserts itself. On their own, the subjectivity that Henry 
perceives in Erasmus and Mendelssohn appears to be a valid reading: 
he sees the Other, however alien and unapproachable, within them. 
In concert with the taxidermied animals, however, whose skins and 
eye sockets Henry invests with subjectivity, the narrator’s perception 
proves unreliable. Corpses do not have self, and even less so the mani-
cured, structured, disarticulated skins and bones of corpses, and thus 
any subjectivity Henry sees in the taxidermied mount is one that he 
has imposed upon it, which in turn undermines the subjectivity of the 
living animals in the novel. There are hints at true subjectivity, as when 
the rabies that consumes Erasmus marks the absence of a subject that 
can only be absent if it had once been present, but the mediation of an 
unreliable narrator makes suspect all representation of that subjectivity.
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Elsie Cloete writes that “Because a tiger neither knows nor cares 
about its authoring[,] it remains the writer’s responsibility to animot an 
alterity that cannot be bridged” (331). Originating from the human, 
all narrative is in some measure an appropriation of representation, a 
claiming and fixing of the natures of particular things or beings into 
the shapes that writers and orators craft within the limits of the tools 
— vocabulary, style, diction, etc. — at their disposal. This fixing is at 
some level an act of objectifying by dictating what a thing or being or 
person is, as both Henry and the taxidermist do in Beatrice and Virgil. It 
should be possible, however, to gesture toward the animal subject in the 
animal representation, to “translate” the animal subject into linguistic 
representations (McKay 72). There are glimmers of this translation in 
Beatrice and Virgil, particularly where Erasmus is concerned: his indif-
ference to the animal mounts, inexplicable to Henry; his response to 
the taxidermist and the howler monkey’s cry; his loss of “self” to rabies. 
Because Henry projects subjectivity onto animal skins and taxidermied 
mounts as well as living animals, however, all the evidence that he pre-
sents for subjectivity is suspect, and the many layers of metanarrative 
foreground the process of representation over the animal. On the other 
extreme, Beatrice and Virgil’s manufactured subjectivity hinges on an 
anthropomorphism so pronounced that their characters’ animality is 
as superficial as that of the taxidermied mounts at Okapi Taxidermy. 
Representing animals as animals is difficult to achieve. Beatrice and 
Virgil reads, on the surface, as a text that speaks to the subjectivity 
of nonhuman animals in its animal characters and the ways in which 
it problematizes the treatment of nonhuman animals. However, the 
unreliability of the narrator and the novel’s emphasis on the process of 
creating representation undermine the subjectivity of the novel’s liv-
ing animals, and the strength of the allegory in A 20th-Century Shirt 
undermines the animality of the play’s subjects. Beatrice and Virgil ’s 
treatment of animals is complex, but it struggles to represent nonhuman 
animal subjectivity as something more than a mirror reflecting back the 
subjectivity that a human narrator scripts.
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Notes
1 For Martel’s commentary on the animal other, see his interview with Sabine Sielke.
2 The Nature Faker controversy of the early twentieth century is probably the most 
well-known debate about the qualities of anthropomorphism. See Lutts for a compilation 
of much of this literature and the criticism of it.
3 The use of human names as symbolic signposts for animal characters recurs in 
Martel’s work, both with Erasmus and Mendelssohn within Beatrice and Virgil itself and 
with the tiger Richard Parker in Life of Pi. Cloete’s “Tigers, Humans, and Animots” pro-
vides an analysis of Richard Parker and the provenance of his name and its significance 
to Life of Pi.
4 For a detailed reading of representations of the Holocaust in Beatrice and Virgil, see 
Haswell.
5 The title used here is the one used in Beatrice and Virgil and is one of several variants.
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